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Abstract
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) studies are extensively used for mission 
critical systems (e.g., weapons systems) to predict the RAM parameters at the preliminary design 
phase.  A RAM methodology is presented for predicting facility/laboratory inherent availability 
(i.e., availability that only considers the steady-state effects of design) at the preliminary design 
phase in support of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 430.1A (Life Cycle Asset Management)
and DOE Order 420.1B (Facility Safety).  The methodology presented identifies the appropriate 
system-level reliability and maintainability metrics and discusses how these metrics are used in a 
fault tree analysis for predicting the facility/laboratory inherent availability.  The inherent 
availability predicted is compared against design criteria to determine if changes to the 
facility/laboratory preliminary design are necessary to meet the required availability objective in 
the final design.
Introduction
Understanding the structure of a facility’s life-cycle cost during design phase is paramount to 
successful mission of the facility. Life-cycle cost of a facility is defined as all costs related to 
land acquisition, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.  Operation 
and maintenance costs, which typically comprise a large portion of the overall life-cycle cost, are 
greatly influenced by the facility’s original design.  Application of Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability (RAM) analysis at the preliminary design phase can help determine the degree to 
which reliability and maintainability are incorporated into facility design.  Comparison of 
analysis results to design criteria can help determine if changes to the preliminary design are 
necessary to meet the required availability objective in the final design and to optimize the
overall facility life-cycle cost.
This paper presents a RAM methodology using fault tree technique for predicting facility/
laboratory inherent availability at the preliminary design phase in support of DOE Order 430.1A 
(Life Cycle Asset Management)1 and DOE Order 420.1B (Facility Safety).2
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RAM Parameters Defined
Reliability is the probability that a component or system will perform a required function for a 
given period of time when used under stated operating conditions.3  The reliability metric 
typically used for components and systems when evaluating a facility’s inherent availability at
design phase is Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) or failure rate (λ) which is the inverse of 
MTBF (λ = 1/MTBF).  Since most failures during useful life of a component or system (steady-
state condition) are random, it is typically assumed that the MTBF and λ values during this 
period remain constant.  This is depicted in the classic bathtub curve provided in Figure 1 below.  
 
Maintainability (M) is the probability that a failed component or system will be restored or 
repaired to a specified condition within a period of time when maintenance is performed in
accordance with prescribed procedures.3  The maintainability metric typically used for 
components and systems when evaluating a facility’s inherent availability at design phase is 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) or repair rate (μ) which is the inverse of MTTR (μ = 1/MTTR).
The repair time is considered to be an inherent design feature of a system or component and 
includes time factors related to accessibility, diagnosis, repair or replacement, and verification of 
proper operation (time factors related to administrative delays are excluded).  During the useful 
life (steady-state condition) of a component or system, the MTTR and μ values are expected to 
remain constant if the design of the facility is not going to change.
 
Availability is the probability that a component or system is performing its required function at a 
given point in time or over a stated period of time when operated and maintained in a prescribed 
manner.3  Availability is a function of both reliability and maintainability.  When evaluating a
preliminary design, Inherent Availability is the parameter of interest.  This availability only 
considers steady-state reliability and corrective maintenance (or repair) effects of a component or 
system and thus is solely a function of the inherent design characteristics and is defined as:
A = MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR)
This equation shows that the same availability can be achieved with different levels of reliability 
(MTBF) and maintainability (MTTR).  With higher reliability, lower levels of maintainability are 
needed to achieve the same availability and vice versa.
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Relationship to Safety Analysis
The relationship of RAM to safety analysis is best illustrated using the event tree shown in 
Figure 2.  This event tree represents a simple accident with an initiating event and two systems 
(Systems A and B) that provide preventive and/or mitigating functions in response to the event.  
The failure probabilities of System A and B are denoted by PA and PB, respectively.  Since an 
initiating event can result from hardware failure or human error, it can be discerned that
incorporating sound reliability and maintainability principles in design can lower the initiating 
event frequency (IEf) and thus lower the sequence frequencies.  Similarly, incorporating sound 
reliability and maintainability principles in design of preventive and mitigative systems will 
lower their failure probabilities (PA and PB) and thus additionally reduce the sequence 
frequencies.  Also, any design changes resulting from a RAM analysis could potentially provide 
consequence reductions. Reductions in sequence frequencies and consequences would then 
lower the overall risk.
Analysis Approach
The overall approach for evaluating the inherent availability of a facility’s preliminary design is 
depicted in Figure 3.  A brief discussion of the main elements is provided below.
Facility Mission
The facility mission and the duration of the mission must be properly defined at the beginning of 
the analysis.  Facilities could have one or more missions with different availability requirements.  
For example, a facility could have an Operating Mode reflecting the purpose for which the
facility is designed for as well as a secondary mission to provide prevention and mitigation 
capabilities in response to abnormal events and accidents (Event Mode). The inherent 
availability requirement for all facility missions must be defined. This is typically a requirement 
that is imposed by the facility owner/user (e.g., DOE) on the architect engineer designing the 
facility. Inherent availability requirement are usually specified in terms of number of hours per 
year or a percentage (e.g., 95%) on annual basis.  
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Figure 2 – Event Tree Representation of an Accident.
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Systems Required for Mission Success
A facility is a collection of systems which work in concert to perform a certain mission.  The 
initial phase of the evaluation requires identification of all facility systems that are required to 
achieve mission success for each mission.  These systems are those whose failure would put the 
facility in repair mode and thus render it unavailable.  To this end, a review of design documents 
is essential to ensure proper understanding of the facility, systems, and interactions between 
systems.
Systems are either front-line or support.  A front-line system is a system (e.g., ventilation system, 
fire detection and suppression system) that directly supports the facility mission(s). A support 
system is a system that supports one or more front-line systems (e.g., instrument air system).  For 
both front-line and support systems, the functional success criteria and the minimum number of 
equipment required for functional success (e.g., 1 out of 2 fans, instrument air availability) must 
be defined.  A dependency matrix similar to what is shown in Figure 4 could be developed to 
establish the relationship between the front-line and support systems.  This will act as a guide to
ensure that system interactions are properly modeled.
System A System B System C System D System E System F
System G X X
System H X X
System I X X
System J X
System K X X X X
System L X X
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Figure 4 – Frontline-to-Support Dependency Matrix
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For all front-line and support systems the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation and control
(I&C) boundaries must also be defined.  This is important since certain components or systems
may be omitted from the analysis due to contractual reasons, passive nature of some of the 
components/systems, or lack of availability of resources.  Structural and piping systems are 
typically omitted due to their passive nature and the higher reliability associated with these 
systems.  Additionally, conditions that can result in failure of structures are usually beyond the 
normal operating environment of the facility. Exclusion of these systems is not expected to 
change the outcome of the analysis.
Availability Prediction Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
A number of techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), 
and Markov Analysis (MA) are available that can be used for RAM modeling.  FTA is a top-
down, deductive, technique that graphically depicts the combination of failures that can lead to 
an undesirable event through use of logical connections (e.g., OR Gate, AND Gate, Transfers).9  
The RBD technique shows the logical connections between components of the system using  
block representation of component reliability.  FTA perspective is on faults and failures 
(unreliability/unavailability), whereas RBD works in the success space (reliability/availability).  
MA looks at a system as being in one of several states (e.g., all components operating, one 
component failed, two components failed, all components failed) with the objective to find the 
probability of the system being in each state.  The reader is referred to References 3 and 9 for 
additional detail on FTA, RBD, and MA techniques.   
Traditionally, the FTA and RBD tools have been only capable of modeling combinatorial 
systems (i.e., those in which failures are not sequence dependent).  Additionally, these tools have 
had difficulty capturing the component repair events necessary for availability prediction.  MA 
on the other hand allows for proper treatment of sequence dependent failures and repair events 
and can be used in both combinatorial and non-combinatorial systems.  The complexity 
associated with MA, however, is much higher than RBD and FTA and, therefore, it requires a 
much greater effort to perform, especially when dealing with large, multi-component, systems.  
Most FTA and RBD software tools available today are hybrid tools that integrate the FTA or 
RBD technique with MA so that sequence dependent events and repair events can be properly 
modeled.  
This paper focuses on the use of FTA augmented with MA, as necessary, for inherent availability 
prediction.  In FTA, facility unavailability is modeled through fault tree logical connections 
representing system unavailabilities, and systems unavailabilities are modeled using component 
unavailabilities represented by basic events under system logic.   
A fault tree is developed for each facility mission when evaluating inherent unavailability.  
Mission unavailability is represented by the highest level gate in the fault tree called the top gate
(see Figure 5).  The logic under the top gate includes front-line system unavailabilities.  These 
systems are those required to operate for mission success.  
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A fault tree for each required system is developed and properly connected to the top gate (see 
Figure 6).  The system success criteria discussed earlier will facilitate construction of the fault 
tree for each system.  The knowledge of what is required for system success will help determine 
what can cause system failure.  
The events at the lowest level in system fault trees represent equipment unavailabilities, human 
error probabilities, or external event-induced unavailabilities (e.g., loss of offsite power-induced 
unavailability, loss of natural gas-induced unavailability).  It is essential that all assumptions 
made during fault tree modeling be documented.  
Often times Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are performed during the design phase with the objective of 
improving the design reliability. These analyses, if available, should be used to facilitate fault 
tree modeling.
The inherent unavailability for each facility mission is determined by quantifying the top gate for 
that facility mission.  This is accomplished by quantification of all basic events via the system 
logic to determine system unavailability and then rolling up the system level results through the
System A 
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System B 
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Unavailable
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Unavailable
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top level logic to determine the facility inherent unavailability. The inherent availability of the 
facility is the complement of the calculated inherent unavailability (or A = 1-U).
Treatment of Dependent Failures
FTA requires proper modeling of dependencies.  Dependent failures (also referred to as common 
mode failures) are comprised of the following two types of failures:
· Internal (or Intrinsic), and 
· External (or Extrinsic) (or Common Cause Failures).
Internal dependent failures include those related to support systems (e.g., instrument air) that can 
render front-line system(s) unavailable as well as single point failures that can impact redundant 
components or systems.  Support system failures may affect one or more front-line systems and 
are directly modeled under the logic for the supported front-line system(s).  
External dependent failures or common cause failures (CCF) are component failures that occur at 
the same time, or in a short time interval, due to a common external coupling factor (e.g., 
environment, maintenance, storage) disabling redundant components. Common cause failures
can be important contributors to availability and thus their inclusion is important in modeling, 
when appropriate.  Although a number of techniques exist for modeling of common cause 
failures4, the two most widely used are the β-Factor Method and the Multiple Greek Letter 
(MGL) Method.  Use of the simpler β-Factor Method is adequate in most cases.  These 
techniques are not discussed in this paper.  
Common cause failures can be explicitly modeled in the fault tree using basic events.  Certain 
software tools allow for implicit modeling of common cause failures once the β values and 
common cause component groups are identified.
Fault Tree Basic Event Mathematical Modeling
It is essential that the mathematical modeling of each fault tree basic event be done properly
based on the type of event modeled.  Some typical models used for fault tree basic event 
quantification are discussed below. It should be noted that these models are not meant to be 
exhaustive and thus additional models may need to be used, as necessary, depending on the 
events that are modeled in the fault trees. 
Most basic events in fault trees represent unavailability of repairable components (e.g., pumps, 
fans).  These basic events are quantified using the following formulation derived using Markov 
Analysis for a single repairable component assuming constant failure and repair rates (λ and μ),
both mean values:3
Umean  = (λ/(λ + μ)) x (1 – e-(λ+ μ)t)
For large values of time (t) (steady-state conditions), the exponential term drops out and the 
equation reduces to:
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Umean =  λ/(λ + μ) = MTTR/(MTBF + MTTR)
Basic events that represent steady-state unavailabilities of repairable components that are in 
standby with a protective function (e.g., interlocks) are quantified using the following 
formulation derived using Markov Analysis, where λ is mean failure rate (constant), MTTR is 
mean time to repair, and T represents the periodic inspection interval:3
Umean = [λT – (1 - e-λT) + λMTTR (1 - e-λT)]/[λT + λMTTR (1 - e-λT)]
Standby components may not have their failures revealed until they are required to operate, or 
until inspection (test) takes place; only at these times repairs can be performed.  The above 
formulation assumes perfect repair that restores the component to as good as new condition.  
For standby components an estimation of the inspection interval at design phase is necessary for 
quantification of the associated basic events.  For safety systems that are governed by IEC-61508 
Standard8, the inspection interval used in the above equation must be consistent with that 
determined as part of the safety integrity level (SIL) assessment performed under IEC-61508.
Basic events that represent unavailabilities of repairable components with mission times much 
shorter than the facility mission time and without the possibility of repair due to the short 
mission time are quantified using the following formulation, where λ is the mean failure rate 
(constant) and T represents the component mission time:3
Umean = 1 – e-λT
This model is derived from the first equation above by setting μ to zero and is used for 
quantifying component unavailabilities that only contribute to system unavailability during 
certain phases of the facility mission.
Quantification of basic events that represent unavailabilities due to external initiators such as loss 
of offsite power or loss of natural gas supply to the facility require both the frequencies of the 
events as well as the mean duration of the events and are quantified using the following 
formulation:10
Umean = Frequency x Duration 
Basic events representing component unavailabilities due to common cause failures are 
quantified using the following formulation if the β-Factor Method is used, where λ is mean 
failure rate for the failure mode of interest and β is the fraction of the failure rate that is due to 
common causes:4
Umean = βλ
Human actions (e.g., failure to isolate main line and use bypass line) are modeled in fault trees, 
as necessary.  Quantification of fault tree basic events that represent unavailabilities due to 
human failure to perform certain actions require mean human error probabilities (HEPs) as input.  
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Data   
During facility design phase, generally no facility-specific data is available.  As such, data from 
similar facilities, if available, or generic data can be used in model quantification, as appropriate.  
It should be noted that in certain cases the use of specific data sources may be specified and 
required by the facility owner/user (e.g., DOE). 
A number of generic data sources that are sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the DOE are identified and discussed in NUREG/CR-682310.  The 
Savannah River Site (SRS) generic component database15 is also available as a source of 
component failure data.  These data sources provide component failure rates that can be used in 
model quantification. The component failure rate data should be selected judiciously to ensure 
applicability to events modeled and to minimize the uncertainty. It is critical to define what the 
component boundary is in order to collect the right component failure rate data.  Additionally, 
the component failure rate data selected should reflect the component failure mode being 
modeled.  
Frequencies and durations of external initiating events (e.g., loss of offsite power or loss of 
natural gas) are dependent on the area in which the facility resides.  Since facility-specific values 
do not exist during design phase, applicable data from similar facilities in the same locale, if 
available, can be used in model quantification.  Otherwise generic data from data sources such as 
Reference 11 may be used, as appropriate.
MTTR values for certain components are published in the literature.7,14 However, published 
MTTR values are scarce and, therefore, in most cases it may be necessary to derive the MTTR 
values based on past experience with similar components and/or engineering judgment.  In such 
cases, the derivation of MTTR values should consider the following time factors:
· time to access (e.g., removing guards or panels)
· time to diagnose failure, 
· time to disassemble,
· time to remove failed parts and replace with new parts,
· time to reassemble, and
· time to verify proper operation.
Derivation of the MTTR values assumes availability of the spare parts required for the corrective 
maintenance task; additionally, it assumes that the maintenance crew has the required skill to be 
able to perform the corrective maintenance task.
HEP values for the human actions modeled either can be directly obtained from sources such as 
NUREG/CR -12785 or SRS human error database16, as appropriate, or can be calculated if
necessary using the available Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques.6,17  
Common cause failure β values can be obtained from data sources such as References 12 and 13.  
10 of 12
Evaluation of Fault Tree Results
The calculated inherent availability is compared against design criteria to determine if the 
availability goal is met.  If the estimated inherent availability exceeds the design goal with an 
adequate margin of uncertainty, the design objective is met.  However, if the estimated inherent 
availability is below the design goal, the assumptions made in the analysis and the uncertainties 
that exist in the data should be examined to determine if any changes in those areas (e.g., 
removing conservatisms) could potentially improve the overall result.  If examination of the 
assumptions and the uncertainties does not impact the overall result, design changes may need to 
be considered.  The fault tree results can be evaluated to identify dominant contributors to 
unavailability. Any design change considerations should initially focus on these dominant 
contributors as well as items that would have minimal impact on the overall design.  Design 
change considerations may include the following, among others:
· selecting high quality (high reliability) components for dominant contributors,
· adding redundancy,
· adding diversity,
· reducing number of parts/components, and
· improving maintainability (i.e., lowering MTTR). 
In order to improve maintainability, the repair time and thus MTTR must be reduced.  This can 
be accomplished by methods such as incorporating self-diagnosis and fault detection capability
into design, parts standardization and interchangeability, and improved accessibility to failed 
components/parts.  
Preserve Inherent Availability
It is important to ensure that the inherent availability is preserved over the useful life of the 
facility after construction and commissioning. The RAM parameters tend to degrade overtime; 
some of the reasons for this degradation include:
· change in operating concept,
· change in operating environment,
· inadequate training,
· improper maintenance,
· aging/wear-out,
· change in supplier, and
· use of lower quality parts.
Developing and implementing programs such as Reliability-Centered Maintenance can help 
determine the critical versus non-critical components, and to identify the required maintenance
tasks and frequencies to preserve component reliability, commensurate with component 
criticality. Maintenance strategies such as repair versus replacement policy, application of 
condition-based maintenance, spare parts inventory optimization, formal maintenance planning, 
root cause failure analysis, training of operations and maintenance personnel can also help 
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maintain system/component reliability and maintainability and thus preserve the overall facility 
availability following construction and commissioning.
Conclusions
Application of RAM to facility preliminary design can help determine the degree to which 
reliability and maintainability as well as safety are incorporated into facility design and to 
determine whether the availability objective in design is met.  Although a number of techniques 
are available to perform a RAM analysis, FTA augmented with MA, as necessary, is judged to 
be a viable technique.  Developing and implementing sound maintenance strategies are essential 
to ensure availability is preserved over the useful life of the facility.
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